Russia has upper hand in ground war – but not at sea

The past few days have marked a significant moment in the maritime war between Russia and Ukraine. On Monday, July 15, Ukraine’s navy spokesman, Dmytro Pletenchuk, claimed: “The last patrol ship of the Black Sea fleet of the Russian Federation is bolting from our Crimea just now. Remember this day.”

This symbolic milestone is a reminder of Ukraine’s consistent success on the maritime front of the war. While Kyiv’s ground troops continue to struggle and cede ground at points along the battlefield, particularly in the east of Ukraine, it’s a different story at sea.

Despite starting the war with a massive numerical advantage, Russia’s Black Sea fleet has been unable to contribute to the war in any meaningful way. Moscow has lost control of the Black Sea, while even Crimea’s ports – including Sevastopol, traditionally a symbol of Russia’s power – can no longer be seen as safe bases for its warships.

A depleted Black Sea fleet

Ukraine does not have an operational navy – it has no major surface warships or submarines, and just a handful of small patrol boats. Yet Kyiv has developed a credible capability to destroy Russia’s warships at long distances – as far away as Crimea – using missiles and maritime drones. It’s an object lesson in the changing nature of maritime warfare and the growing power of asymmetric weapons – that is, weapons that cost much less to manufacture than the warships they are destroying.

It’s a major problem for Russia because warships are among its most expensive military assets, with a procurement cycle that can span decades. And Vladimir Putin’s depleted Black Sea fleet cannot be reinforced with warships from Russia’s other fleets because of the application of the Montreux Convention by Turkey. Signed