Countering China’s rare earth dominance and coercion

In December, the People’s Republic of China announced a retaliatory restriction of rare-earth element processing technology, a continuation of its strategy to monopolize the critical mineral market.

Comprising a substantial proportion of what the United States categorizes as “critical minerals,” these elements are used extensively in crucial end products ranging from clean energy technologies to defense systems.

The PRC has wielded this dominance to enact its own policies or punishments on dependent countries in the past, notably in 2010 against Japan after a Senkaku Islands territorial dispute.

While Tokyo recognized its vulnerabilities and diversified away from Chinese-supplied minerals, Washington has failed to take similar sufficient actions toward securing mineral supply in the decade since.

Nevertheless, heightened aggression from the PRC in the Indo-Pacific region and a more confrontational posture from the Trump and Biden administrations has resulted in other action in critical mineral policy. These efforts include heavy investment into stateside extraction, processing, recycling and R&D for substitutes.

Despite this emphasis on domestic reform, mining alone will not suffice to meet America’s demand. Future US independence from Chinese critical minerals supplies lies in friendshoring, or the integration of friendly, stable countries into supply chains.

The Biden administration is focusing heavily on forming these agreements in both a bilateral, spoke-and-wheel style and through pre-existing multinational frameworks – all with moderate success.

In addition to pledges to retain critical mineral trade and negotiations on import tariffs, some of these deals allow other nations to take advantage of the tax credits for