The US election and North Korean denuclearization

To no one’s surprise, 2024 is turning out to be a unique US election year in which speculation about changes in US foreign policy under each of the two candidates if elected far exceeds actual comments or insights provided by either camp.

Candidate Trump has, not surprisingly, left options open and spoken more in terms of where President Biden allegedly failed.

Meanwhile, the Biden-Harris team [as of this writing, before President Joe Biden’s July 21 withdrawal from the race and endorsement of Vice President Kamala Harris as his successor] has defended its current policy and avoided suggestions that fundamental changes are necessary.

Filling the vacuum of substantial policy debate thus far are experts across the political spectrum. There is much rumination about possible new policy directions regarding North Korea and its growing nuclear weapons program.

There is universal consensus that North Korea’s nuclear capability poses a growing, dangerous threat that will challenge the winner of this year’s election for the coming four years. The foundational questions being asked boil down to two: “Do the Democrats have any North Korea Plan B for the next term?” and “What would a resumed Trump-Kim Jong Un relationship yield?”

There is a predictable claim that Washington’s current policy toward Pyongyang failed and that the status quo is unacceptable. It’s predictable since this is what foreign policy wonks are paid to do – not necessarily because there exist alternative policies, superior to those in place now, that would have a better chance of success.

There are growing calls for shifting away from the goal of complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea to an allegedly more reasonable arms control approach that