Super Garuda Shield vs Falcon Strike: inside the US and China’s military drills

By contrast, the Falcon Strike 2024 exercises, held from August 18-29, focused more on strategic aims such as cross-border support and joint air defence – essential components, Chinese state media reported, for “a small-scale war”.

Thailand’s involvement in Falcon Strike reveals its cautious stance towards the US, according to Yokie Rahmad Isjchwansyah, a research fellow at the Paramadina Graduate School of Diplomacy in Jakarta, particularly after Washington’s rejection of its bid for F-35 stealth fighter jets last year.

The US reportedly withheld the sale of its advanced F-35s – which are sold only to its closest allies like Australia, Japan, South Korea and Singapore – due to concerns over training and technical requirements.

“On the whole, however, China is still more comfortable with simpler bilateral exercises rather than more complex multilateral drills,” Storey said.

The evolving nature of the Thai-China Falcon Strike exercises reflects this trend, becoming increasingly sophisticated yet remaining “primarily performative in nature”, he said.

“It’s inconceivable that their armed forces would fight alongside each other in a regional conflict,” Storey added, underscoring the limitations of their partnership.

Abdul Rahman Yaacob, a research fellow with the Lowy Institute’s Southeast Asia programme, highlights a crucial disparity: the number of multilateral exercises involving China pales in comparison to those conducted by the US, which has maintained a key security role in the region since World War II. This long-standing presence has allowed Washington to forge a vast network of security partnerships that it can leverage for joint exercises.

In recent years, China has expressed a growing interest in expanding its military