South China Sea doesn’t have to define Sino-Philippine relations

By reiterating his country’s benign intentions and a commitment to diplomatic engagement with China, Marcos provided a path towards de-escalation.

The Philippines could also ease tensions by reconsidering any massive expansion in American soldiers on its soil, or the introduction of Japanese troops, especially in areas close to Taiwan. In turn, Beijing could dial down its aggressive interceptions of Philippine patrols and resupply missions in the South China Sea.

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Chinese floating barrier blocks entrance to Philippine ships at South China Sea flashpoint

But both sides emerged with different interpretations of the visit. For China, it represented the first step of a long diplomatic dance with a new Filipino president who had sent mixed signals throughout his election campaign. In the Philippines, the visit ended up strengthening China hawks in the administration, facilitating a major foreign policy reboot.

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Why is the Philippines aligning itself with the US after years of close China ties under Duterte

The upshot is a perilous “security dilemma” dynamic, with each side inadvertently escalating tensions by ostensibly acting in self-defence. Instead, both sides should consider the following quid pro quo confidence-building measures:

On its part, the Marcos administration can recalibrate the parameters of the EDCA, namely the size and nature of America’s military presence in the northern Philippine provinces. It should also reconsider granting the Pentagon access to strategic bases, including in Mavulis near Taiwan or Thitu Island in the Spratlys, while reassessing any plans to grant Japanese troops rotational access to Philippine military facilities.

This could go hand in hand with the relocation and reorientation of some