Post-coup Myanmar has not turned into a Chinese vassal state

09:33

Myanmar’s military government lost direct control over 86% of its territory after months of fighting

However, despite its disruptive impact, the army’s power grab did not alter the underlying logic that crafts Myanmar’s relationship with the outside world, nor did it pave the way for the twilight of the country’s historical non-aligned stance vis-à-vis great powers. Post-coup Myanmar is not truly isolated on the global stage, not even from the Western camp, considering that both India and Japan decided to defect from the Washington-led sanctions regime.

Moreover, Myanmar is not progressively turning into a Chinese vassal state. Rather, it can be argued that the coup and its dramatic aftermath damaged Sino-Myanmar relations by creating an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and distrust.

Accordingly, as the military junta continues to navigate a nuanced foreign policy that is consistent with the non-aligned playbook practised by generations of Burmese policymakers, Naypyidaw’s post-coup international trajectory serves as a reminder that pariah states can still exercise agency and strategic autonomy. Myanmar’s agency is apparent in the manner in which it addressed the diplomatic fallout of the coup, seeking to fill the power gap left by the retreat of Western stakeholders by reaching out to alternative actors, which can also act as partial counterweights to China.

Furthermore, Naypyidaw’s constrained yet resilient international agency is visible in the quiet engagement process nurtured with India and Japan, which share the same fear of seeing the troubled Southeast Asian state becoming a Chinese satellite. Interestingly, 2021–2022 proved to be a record year for India-Myanmar trade, as the combined volume of bilateral exchanges