Muscle and mediation swirl in the South China Sea

The state visit to Beijing by Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr in January 2023 did not yield the momentum for bilateral ties that his predecessor’s trip in 2017 did. Barely one month after the state visit, there was a flareup in the South China Sea (SCS) with the Chinese coastguard’s lasing of its Philippine counterpart off Second Thomas Shoal.

The situation went downhill, especially after Manila publicized Beijing’s coercive behavior. There was the floating barrier incident in the Scarborough Shoal, though the focal point has centered on the Second Thomas Shoal where the Chinese and Filipinos faced off.

Chinese forces harassed the Philippine rotation and resupply missions to the outpost and fired water cannons at the latter — the first documented instance since 2021. 2023 was eventful for SCS disputes beyond incidents between Beijing and Manila. Other Southeast Asian parties in the SCS continued business as usual.

Malaysia and Vietnam continue to contend with regular Chinese forays into their exclusive economic zones. Hanoi silently strengthened its hold in the Spratlys through its land reclamation projects.

Extra-regional actors outside the SCS kept a constant presence. Japan is advancing defense and security links with Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam via its new Overseas Security Assistance framework.

The United States has elevated ties with Indonesia and Vietnam to comprehensive strategic partnerships. Australia and the United States commenced joint air and sea patrols with the Philippines in the SCS.

Within a month, the US Navy conducted three freedom of navigation operations which explicitly targeted Second Thomas Shoal. That might not have rolled back Beijing’s actions, but it plausibly deterred