Outplaying China key to defeating Myanmar’s junta

After a string of humiliating defeats at the hands of various ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), the collapse of Myanmar’s junta—the State Administrative Council (SAC)—is an increasingly plausible scenario.

As such, China’s heightened involvement in Myanmar at this crucial time is no coincidence. The visits of high-ranking Chinese officials, the summoning of ERO leaders and invitations extended to Myanmar’s political elders to Beijing all signal China’s desire to keep Myanmar firmly within its sphere of influence.

Despite its official policy on non-interference in Myanmar’s internal affairs, China has strategically hedged its bets on both sides of the conflict to protect its economic and security interests.

Along with Russia, it remains a major arms supplier to the junta and uses its veto power at the UN to shield the regime. Simultaneously, China provides economic and military support to several EROs along the Chinese border that have long fought Myanmar’s military for greater autonomy.

Beijing appears to favor a weakened SAC that maintains control over central Myanmar while ceding peripheral territories to the EROs. China likely seeks to legitimize this arrangement by facilitating an election where political parties aligned with armed groups divide seats in the national assembly, prioritizing a ceasefire at any cost.

This approach disregards the majority of the Myanmar people’s desire for the military to be entirely removed from politics, with its role limited solely to national defense.

It is well known that China tacitly endorsed the launch of Operation 1027 by the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and Arakan Army, only to